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ABSTRACT 
The Ebola virus and its now infamous 2014 West African outbreak have constituted 
the deadliest and most terrifying epidemic of recent memory. Not only does the 
epidemic now carry an already ghastly backdrop in the public mind when 
discussions around it begin, but, like the AIDS epidemic, cultural practices have 
contributed to the entrenchment of Ebola in Africa, compounded by weak human 
rights laws and stigmatization, all of these factors having contributed to the multi-
faceted and complex nature of addressing the problem of eliminating this disease in 
Africa. This article examines the African countries that have been plagued by the 
recent outbreak, as well as the U.S. response to Ebola when brought to its shores. It 
also considers the human rights implications that are invariably intertwined with the 
prevention of Ebola, as well as the various ethical aspects that have surrounded the 
response. The article further examines the possible extent to which sub-Saharan 
African states may be able to leverage the flexibility of the so called Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) to provide access to 
Ebola medical advances for their citizens. Lastly, this article will look at the Siracusa 
Principles, which outlines the circumstances within which restriction of human rights 
are justified, and will analyze the conduct of international responders, including the 
African Union, the CDC, WHO, and others. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
he Ebola virus is one of several viruses that cause hemorrhagic 
fever.
1
 Ebola was found in 1976 in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, a country known as Zaire at the time of Ebola’s discovery.
2
 
The initial Ebola outbreak was in a village near the Ebola River.
3
 It is 
after this river that the disease is named.
4
 There are five viral strains 
that have been identified.
5
 According to the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, there are four known strains that cause disease in 
humans: the Ebola virus (Zaire ebolavirus); the Sudan virus (Sudan 
ebolavirus); the Taï Forest virus (Taï Forest ebolavirus, formerly Côte 
d’Ivoire ebolavirus); and the Bundibugyo virus (Bundibugyo 
ebolavirus).
6
 The Ebola Zaire virus is the deadliest of the five viral 
strains, having not only the highest mortality rate, but also the 
distinction of causing the most outbreaks.
7
 The fifth strain, the Reston 
virus (Reston ebolavirus), has not caused death in humans, but has 
been found to affect nonhuman primates and pigs.
8
 The World Health 
                                                 
1
 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Signs and Symptoms: 
Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever 1 (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZD6W-EWBT]. Ebola symptoms can appear anywhere within 
a range of two to twenty-one days after exposure; but on average, they appear 
within a range of eight to ten days after exposure to the virus. Id. 
2
 See Michaeleen Doucleff, Ebola in the Skies? How The Virus Made it to West 
Africa, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 19, 2014, 5:14 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda /2014/08/19/341468027/ebola-in-the-
skies-how-the-virus-made-it-to-west-africa [https://perma.cc/U4VL-AHMS]. In 
the summer of 1976, a young Zairian doctor named Ngoy Mushola traveled to a 
rural village in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He learned that people 
were dying of a strange disease near the shores of the Ebola River. Id. 
3
 Id.  
4
 See Charles Patrick Davis, Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever (Ebola Virus Disease), 




 About Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 





 Doucleff, supra note 2. 
8
 This strain infects primates, pigs, and humans, but it causes few if any 
symptoms and no deaths in humans. Davis, supra note 4. 
T 
2017 The Ebola Virus Prevention and Human Rights Implication 5 
Organization has determined that the virus responsible for the now 
infamous 2014 West African Outbreak belongs to the Zaire strain.
9
 
“Infectious diseases remain an important and often global health 
care challenge and in a globalized and highly mobile and 
interconnected world diseases like . . . Ebola . . . are likely to be spread 
more quickly than in the past.”
10
 Unlike many other viruses, the Ebola 
virus spreads through the transfer of bodily fluids, and, as a result, 
Ebola spreads through “human-to-human transmission by direct 
contact”.
11
 That means that “blood, secretions, organs or other body 
fluids containing the virus must come into contact with broken skin or 
the mucous membranes of a healthy individual in order for the virus to 
be transmitted.”
12
 Ebola’s hemorrhagic fever often has complications, 
including organ failure, severe bleeding, jaundice, delirium, shock, 
seizures, coma, and death.
13
 It is one of the worst infectious 
humanitarian crises of recent times.
14
 “On August 8, 2014, the WHO 
formally declared the Ebola epidemic an ‘international public health 
emergency of international concern.’”
15
 As of September 2014, there 
were about 5,232 reported cases with 2,630 deaths across most regions 
of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
16
 As of July 5, 2015, there have 
been a total of 27,573 reported, confirmed, probable, and suspected 
cases of Ebola Virus Disease in the countries of Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone, with 11246 reported deaths.
17
 Likewise, during the week 
                                                 
9
 Alina Bradford, Ebola: Causes, Symptoms & Treatment, LIVESCIENCE (Mar. 28, 
2016, 4:52 PM), http://www.livescience.com/48311-ebola-causes-symptoms-
treatment.html [https://perma.cc/3QFW-FQZ8]. 
10
 Stefan Kirchner, Ebola, Human Rights and Health Discrimination, JURIST (Oct. 
20, 2014), http://jurist.org/academic/2014/10/stefan-kirchner-health-rights.php 
[https://perma.cc/J5C9-4PL6]. 
11




 Mayo Clinic Staff, Ebola Virus and Marburg Virus: Complications, MAYO 
CLINIC (Aug. 06, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/ebola-
virus/basics/complications/con-20031241 [https://perma.cc/N4FA-6WKQ]. 
14
 Audrey Ceschia, The Institut Pasteur Network: A Crucial Partner Against 
Ebola, 384 LANCET 1239, 1239 (2014). 
15
 Jon. S. Abramson, Ethical Considerations for use of Vaccines in the current 




 Ebola Situation Report, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 8, 2015), 
http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-8-july-2015 
[https://perma.cc/CUZ2-ZD73] [hereinafter WHO, Ebola Situation Report July 
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leading to July 5, 2015, a total of 18 new confirmed cases were 
reported in Guinea, 3 in Liberia, and 9 in Sierra Leone.
18
 Each of these 
countries has had decades of violence and instability, including 
ruthless armed conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and an 
authoritarian regime in Guinea and, as a result, the present heads of 
state and the governments of these countries lead nations with 
shattered infrastructures, with weak or virtually no rule of law, with 
governance issues, with abusive security forces, and with high poverty 
and unemployment rates.
19
 It is with this backdrop, that the presence 
of the deadly disease Ebola becomes an even greater challenge when 
attempting to address its spread. The Ebola crisis is like the AIDS 
epidemic in the sense that cultural practices have contributed to the 
entrenchment of the disease in Africa, compounded by weak human 
rights laws and the stigmatization associated with HIV/AIDS—all of 
which have contributed to the multi-faceted and complex nature of 
addressing this disease in Africa.
20
 
Human rights implications are invariably intertwined with the 
prevention of HIV/AIDS and Ebola. Hence, looking at issues of 
human rights and quarantines, the protection of healthcare workers, 
gender discrimination in view of Ebola, the right to information, the 
conduct of state security forces, and the role of the international 
community would aid in highlighting many lessons and strategies for 
dealing with potential Ebola outbreaks.
21
 Because of the severity of the 
outbreak, there are suggestions that the use of unlicensed products be 
allowed to curtail it, such as through offering therapies and vaccines 
with unknown efficacy and possible adverse effects as treatment or 
                                                                                                                   
8, 2015]. This total includes reported deaths among probable and suspected 
cases, although outcomes for many cases are unknown. Id. 
18
 Id. “The new cases are the first in Liberia since the country was declared free of 
the disease on May 9. . . . The new cases raise questions about whether Liberia 
was actually Ebola free during May and June, or if there was a ‘shadow 
epidemic’ of cases that went undetected by officials.” Rachael Rettner, Ebola 
Returns to Liberia: Where Did It Come From, and Could It Spread?, 
LIVESCIENCE (July 2, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.livescience.com/51433-
ebola-liberia-return.html [https://perma.cc/2VW5-9BNY]. 
19
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, West Africa: Respect Rights in Ebola Response 2-3 
(Sep. 15, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/15/west-africa-respect-
rights-ebola-response [https://perma.cc/NS5C-HSHS]. 
20
 Alan Whiteside & Nicholas Zebryk, Ebola and AIDS in Africa, CAN. J. AFR. 
STUD. 409, 413-416, 414 (2015). 
21
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1. 
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prevention.
22
 This article will look into the ethical considerations of 
doing so. Is safety being compromised? What about the manner and 
process for conducting such clinical trials? Would any such vaccines 
reach the more affluent West first before the African countries can 
have access to them? How could equitable distribution be done in a 
way that the poorer and much more affected African countries can get 
a fair deal, especially so in regards to costs?
23
 I will examine the 
possible extent to which sub-Saharan African states may be able to 
leverage the flexibility of the so called Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) to provide access to 
Ebola medical advances for their citizens, as is the case with 
HIV/AIDS. 
This article examines the African countries that have been plagued 
by the recent outbreak of Ebola in 2014: Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal. Most of its focus is on the three 
countries with the greatest Ebola infection rates: Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
and Liberia. This article will also explore how the United States dealt 
with Ebola when brought to its shores from Sierra Leone. This article 
will also explore how the United States dealt with Ebola when brought 
to its shores from Sierra Leone. The goal will be to pinpoint the factors 
that propagate the diseases, and to examine human rights issues in 
relation to patients and health workers against the backdrop of their 
efforts to protect and prevent the spread of this disease. Hence, this 
article will weigh circumstances within which human rights 
protections are justified against the legitimate and objective interests 
of the public. 
In Part III.A, this article will look at the Siracusa principle, which 
outlines the circumstances within which restriction of human rights are 
justified, especially in light of the above stated human rights issues. 
                                                 
22
 Ethical Considerations for Use of Unregistered Interventions for Ebola Virus 




 “Trazavirin, an Ebola vaccine that was created by the Ural Biopharmaceutical 
Technology Center, was approved for emergency use by Russian Health 
Ministry. The [European Union] has pledged EUR 24.4 million euros for 
research to develop a vaccine against Ebola. WHO estimates several hundred 
thousand vaccines could be produced by the end of 2014, and several more by 
the end of 2015.” USA, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, China – Ebola Updates, DG 
ALERTS (Oct. 24, 2014) http://dgalerts.docguide.com/ebola 
[https://perma.cc/94ME-QZXJ]. 
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Furthermore, it will analyze the response of the international 
community in an attempt to gauge what lessons have been learned, 
with an eye on the role of traditional actors such as the African Union, 
WHO, the CDC, and UNESCO’s role in bioethics, as well as the 
international community’s and its embrace of the wider health and 
humanitarian communities. For example, some doctors have advocated 
for blood transfusion to curb the spread of Ebola, but those efforts 
have widely been regarded as an academic rather than a realistic 
proposal given the magnitude of the epidemic.
24
 
A. Origin and Transmission 
1. The Apparent Origin of Ebola 
As stated in Part I, Ebola first appeared in 1976 in simultaneous 
outbreaks in Sudan and the Republic of Zaire (now the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo).
25
 However, the real question is how the virus 
got to Guinea, a place where the people never had this disease. 
In 2005, researchers looking for the source of Ebola tested more 
than a thousand small animals in Gabon and the Republic of Congo.
26
 
Researchers tested 679 bats, 222 birds and 129 terrestrial vertebrates.
27
 
“The only animal found to be an Ebola virus carrier was the bat, or 
rather, to be more specific, three species of bat: the hammer-headed 
bat, the Franquet’s epauletted fruit bat, and the little collard fruit bat.
28
 
The second of these three fruit bat species is found in Guinea, where 
the 2014 Ebola Outbreak originated.
29
 If indeed it is that bats are the 
                                                 
24
 See Bradford, supra note 9. The survivors of Ebola are so few and the mortality 
is so high that the probability of mustering enough survivors to make a 
difference in the high mortality was very low. Id. Likewise, the nutritional status 
of the few survivors will not inspire anyone to make blood donors out of them, 
let alone procure enough blood as recommended by WHO. Id. 
25
 Id. During the 1976 outbreak, 280 people became infected through close contact 
with one another and through the use of contaminated syringes and needles in 
clinics and hospitals. Id. Out of those 280 people, only 20 percent of the patients 
survived. Id. The virus infected 284 people in Sudan. Id. Out of these, 151, or 53 
percent of all infected patients died. Id. 
26
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source of this virus, then how did the virus transfer to the human 
species? 
People may become infected from bats eaten as meat or prepared 
as an ingredient in soups, which are a delicacy in Guinea.
30
 Such a 
means of infection is the likely reason why after the outbreak in March 
2014 the consumption of such bats was banned.
31
 But this does not 
adequately answer the question as to how the Ebola Zaire strain got to 
Guinea, or West Africa, in the first place. Did Ebola Zaire jump over 
the Gulf of Guinea from Central Africa, from Gabon and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo?
32
 To say that the virus could have 
traveled through an infected person seems implausible, as anyone with 
Ebola’s contagious symptoms is very unlikely to make it through the 
12 hour-drive over the rough terrain.
33
 Disease specialists are 
wondering if the bats migrated to West Africa, or if bats in the region 
had always harbored this virus but had never previously 
communicated it to humans.
34
 “By looking at the virus’ genetic 
materials, researchers have found that same Ebola virus has been 




A recent research study team focused on Méliandou, Guinea, the 
index village where the human outbreak began.
36
 The team gathered 
testimony from survivors and collected samples, including blood and 




 Id. However, cooking the bat would likely kill the virus, so it is the butchering 
of bats and the handling of raw bat meat thatis riskier. Id. 
32
 See Carolyn Crist, Searching for Causes of the Ebola Outbreak, and for a Way 








 See Rettner, supra note 24. 
36
 David Quammen, Insect-Eating Bat May Be Origin of Ebola Outbreak, New 
Study Suggests, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/12/141230-ebola-virus-origin-
insect-bats-meliandou-reservoir-host/ [https://perma.cc/WH57-JFPG]. Shortly 
after the outbreak, Fabian Leendertz of the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin 
assembled a multidisciplinary team which included ecologists and veterinarians, 
as well as an anthropologist, in order to interview local people, and traveled to 
the affected area, near the borders of Liberia and Ivory Coast. Id. 
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tissue from captured bats.
37
 These efforts yielded a new hypothesis: 
“Maybe the reservoir host was a bat, yes—but a very different sort of 
bat, in a different ecological relationship to humans.”
38
 The 
researchers noted that while fruit bats are numerous in southeastern 
Guinea, they don’t nestle in large masses near Méliandou.
39
 However, 
“the village did harbor a sizable number of small, insectivorous bats, 
which roosted under the roofs of houses and . . . hollow trees.”
40
 The 
local people called these bats ”lolibelo.”
41
 Lolibelo were being 




The researchers discovered next “a large hollow tree, which had 
recently been set afire, producing as it burned what someone recalled 
as a ‘rain of bats.’”
43
 “[The researchers] collected soil samples at the 
base of that tree, which eventually yielded traces of DNA assignable 




That species was found to match the first-hand descriptions of 
lolibelo, continuing to short up the theory.
45
 Interestingly enough, “the 
big hollow tree had reportedly been a favorite play spot for the small 
children of the village, including [a] now deceased little boy, despite—
or perhaps because of—the fact that it was full of little bats.”
46
 
Although scientists do not know for certain, the top theory today is 
that the virus spread through the bats, especially given the fact that 
scientists have found Ebola antibodies in bat species widespread 
throughout Africa.
47
 The virus is said to infect and replicate inside bats 
without killing the animals.
48
 It is a now readily accept conclusion that 






















 Doucleff, supra note 2. 
48
 See id. 
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bats can easily spread Ebola.
49
 Bats move around for several, if not 
thousands of miles and, as noted by the research team focused on 
Méliandou: “Bats don’t need a passport to cross borders.”
50
 
2. Transmission and Treatment 
A WHO Ebola Situation Assessment for Oct. 6, 2014, states that 
the virus is most commonly transmitted through blood, feces, and 
vomit.
51
 “Breast milk, urine, and semen have also been found to 
transmit the Ebola virus, and it is believed that it may even be 
transmitted through tears and saliva.”
52
 Ebola is not transmitted 
through air, meaning that a person cannot contract the virus from 
breathing the same air as an infected individual.
53
 “However, if an 
infected individual directly sneezes on a person and the mucus from 
that sneeze comes into contact with an open cut or the eyes, nose or 
mouth of someone else, there is a chance of transmission.”
54
 
According to the CDC, “standard treatment for Ebola hemorrhagic 
fever is still limited to supportive therapy.”
55
 Supportive therapy is 
“balancing the patient’s fluid and electrolytes, maintaining their 
oxygen status and blood pressure, and treating such patients for any 
complicating infections.”
56
 Any patient possibly suffering from “Ebola 
hemorrhagic fever should be isolated, and caregivers should wear 
protective garments” when handling such a patient.
57
 There are no 
licensed medications for the treatment of Ebola per se; instead, doctors 
are currently utilizing to two time-tested options for Ebola treatment: 
1) supportive care, and 2) blood transfusions for Ebola survivors.
58
 






 What We Know About Transmission of the Ebola Virus Among Humans, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/06-
october-2014/en/ [https://perma.cc/Z3G4-2V3N]. 
52
 Bradford, supra note 9. 
53
 See id. 
54
 Id. WHO has not documented cases of this actually happening. Id. 
55






 See Dennis Thompson, For Ebola, No New Drugs Riding to the Rescue—for 
Now, HEALTHDAY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2014), 
https://consumer.healthday.com/senior-citizen-information-31/misc-death-and-
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II. EXAMINING THE COUNTRIES PLAGUED BY EBOLA IN 2014 
A. Guinea 
In the small village of Méliandou, Guinea, is where the first case of 
Ebola began in 2014, with an 18-month-old boy by the name of Emile 
Ouamouno.
59
 He died from Ebola-like symptoms in Méliandou on 
December 2013.
60
 His death was not attributed to Ebola until March 
21, 2014.
61
 By mid-January of 2014, several members of the boy’s 
immediate family had developed similar symptoms and then died soon 
after.
62
 Several “midwives, traditional healers, and staff at a hospital in 
the city of Gueckedou who treated them” met the same untimely end.
63
 
In the subsequent weeks, “members of the boy’s extended family, 
many who attended funerals or took care of other ill relatives also fell 
sick and died.”
64
 By that time the virus had “spread to four sub-
districts via additional transmission chains”
65
 From this “pattern of 
unprotected exposure”, the people of Guinea began to suffer more loss 
of life, more funerals, and further tragic spread of the disease.
66
 
By July 2015, there were 30 confirmed cases of the Ebola virus 
reported in the week leading to the 12th of that month, with 18 cases in 
Guinea.
67
 While progress is being made, only a zero infection rate 
would be an ideal outcome.
68
 










 See id. The boy developed an illness characterized by fever, black stools, and 
















 See generally Ebola Virus in Guinea—Update, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE, (Mar. 30, 2014), 
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B. Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, the Ebola outbreak “began slowly and silently, 
gradually building up to a burst of cases in late May and early June 
[2014].”
69
 By the end of the year, “[c]ases had then increased 
[again]. . . with November seeing the most dramatic jump.”
70
 
Subsequent investigations by the WHO concluded that “[Sierra 
Leone’s] first case was a woman who was a guest at the home of the 
index case in Meliandou, Guinea.”
71
 After the host family became 
symptomatic, “she travelled back to her home in Sierra Leone and died 
shortly after her return in early January 2014.”
72
 On April 1, Sierra 
Leone “stepped up vigilance for imported cases” when “two members 
of the same family who had died from the Ebola virus disease in 
Guinea were repatriated to Sierra Leone for burial.”
73
 
“The burst of new cases [of Ebola] seen in early June [of 2014] 
were traced to the [May 10th] funeral of a respected traditional healer 
held in Sokoma, a remote village in Kailahun district, near the border 
with Guinea.”
74
 This traditional healer apparently “became infected 
while treating Ebola patients who crossed the border from Guinea, 
seeking her healing powers.”
75
 
From this single funeral, “[l]ocal epidemiologists eventually traced 
365 Ebola-related deaths. . . which also seeded cases reported in 
Liberia.”
76
 Towards mid-June, “a state of emergency was declared in 
Kailahun, calling for the closing of schools, cinemas, and places of 
night-time gatherings and the screening of vehicles at checkpoints 
along the borders with Guinea and Liberia.”
77
 “On June 24th, 




















 Id. This particular funeral sparked a chain reaction of more cases, more deaths, 
more funerals, and more cases in multiple transmission chains. Id. 
77
 Id. 
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[Médcines Sans Frontières] opened an Ebola treatment center in 
Kailahun”, but it apparently came a little late, “[a]s an emergency 
coordinator with the charity noted, ‘We came too late when villages 
already had dozens of cases. We don’t know where all chains of 
transmission are taking place.’”
78
 By mid-July, things were so bad that 
“teams trained by WHO buried more than 50 bodies over a 12-day 
period.”
79
 “The death of Dr. Khan, who was regarded as a national 
hero, and surrounding publicity removed many public doubts about 
whether Ebola was ‘real’, and also introduced many questions about 
the safety of the area’s treatment facilities.”
80
 After these repeated 
tragedies, “most foreign medical staff, included [sic] those deployed 
by WHO, suspended operations in Kailahun.”
81
 However, 




In Kenema, Sierra Leone, “health care workers at the government-
run hospital went on strike over unpaid salaries and poor and 
dangerous working conditions” further proof that the country’s 
capacity for dealing with the crisis were being stretched too thinly.
83
 
“As the number of patients, doctors, and nurses dying at the Kenema 
government hospital continued to escalate, [rumors] grew that 
something other than a disease was responsible for such deaths.”
84
 In 
turn, as patients fled or avoided the hospital, more such deaths 
occurred; resulting in the undermining of the effectiveness of 
treatment in isolation as a disease control measure.
85
 
Despite witnessing this slew of death, “[r]esidents of villages near 
Kenema witnessed how quickly the virus could sweep through 






 Id. Confidence in the safety of medical staff was further eroded in the last week 
of August, when a WHO-deployed epidemiologist working in Kailahun became 
infected. Id. This was followed a few days later by three staff at a hotel in which 






 Id. Nurses and burial teams complained that they had not been paid for several 
weeks, had insufficient personal protective equipment, and were forced to use a 
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crowded households, but saw few alternatives to home care.”
86
 The 
results were horrifying; “[the] [s]pread within households, where five 




The WHO field coordinator in Kenema, by opening dialogues with 
local leaders, learned that “what people wanted was a place where 
uninfected members of a household could go to ‘self-isolate’.”
88
 The 
idea that arose from this realization was the adoption of tents to offer 
“sufficient space for one to keep a safe distance from others”.
89
 It was 
the WHO office in Freetown that provided the first tent, with the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
supplying others soon after.
90
 UNICEF donated sleeping mats, bed 
nets, and even cooking equipment.
91
 
However, “[t]he real surge in cases began in September as the 
virus gained foothold in Freetown. Teams were soon struggling to 
bury as many as 30 bodies per day.”
92
 Once the situation had become 
desperately dire, “South Africa deployed a mobile laboratory to 
Freetown and work began to construct Ebola treatment centers”.
93
 By 
the end of September, “the situation had begun to stabilize in Kailahun 
and Kenema,” but in the “Freetown, Port Loko, Bombali, and 
Tonkolili districts. . . there was a sharp and alarming spike in a 
situation described by WHO as ‘continuing to deteriorate’.”
94
 “The 
biggest challenges in the densely populated capital were limited 










 Id. They wanted a low-risk environment to stay in while waiting for the results 
of diagnostic tests. Id. They had observed the repercussions of being infected as 














 Id. In parts of Freetown, as many as three families occupied the same household 
in shifts, increasing even further the risks of disease spread within these 
families. Id. 
16 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 2 
WHO described, as of October, that the situation virus 
transmission in Freetown and the western districts as ‘rampant’, with 
more than 400 new suspected cases being reported each week.”
96
 “On 
October 21, the World Food Programme . . . supported by funding 
from the World Bank to airlift[ed] 20 ambulances and 10 mortuary 
pickup trucks to Freetown to support the government’s efforts to 
shorten the response times.”
97
 There were also an “additional 44 
vehicles [sent] a few weeks later by sea.”
98
 
By December, Sierra Leone’s situation had worsened; the nation 
“surpassed Liberia as the country reporting the largest cumulative 
number of cases.”
99
 The total of “new cases reported that week, at 
nearly 400, was three times as many as in Guinea and Liberia 
combined.”
100
 “Though cases in Kailahun and Kenema had declined to 
only one or two each month, the country was still reporting new cases 
from 10 of its 14 districts.”
101
 
By the end of December, there were over 9000 cases, despite the 
nation’s relatively small population of 6.2 million.
102
 Sierra Leone’s 
officials “noted that denial, traditional burials, and fear were still 
driving [the] spread of the disease in Freetown and adjacent districts, 
where transmission remained intense.”
103
 
By July 2015, there were 30 confirmed cases of Ebola virus 
disease (“EVD”) reported in the week to July 5th: 18 in Guinea, 3 in 
Liberia, and 9 in Sierra Leone, so, there should still be concern for the 




It was announced that Liberia was free of Ebola transmission on 
May 9, 2015, after experiencing no new cases for 42 consecutive 
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days.
105
 Following this, the country subsequently began a 3-month 
period of increased surveillance, collecting approximately 30 blood 
samples and oral swabs each day from potential cases to test for 
EVD.
106
 On June 29, 2015, a confirmed case of Ebola virus surfaced in 
Margibi County, Liberia— the first new case that was confirmed in the 
country since March 2015.
107
 It was a 17-year-old male who became 
ill on June 21, and died on June 28; tests on his body revealed a 
positive result for a strain of the virus that had been previously 
circulating in Liberia, which suggested that the virus was not imported 
from Sierra Leone or Guinea.
108
 To this date, a CDC field team 
continues to work with the Liberian Ministry of Health and other 
partners to determine the source, recognize the chain of transmission, 
and avoid further spread.
109
 
Thirty confirmed cases of EVD were reported in the week of July 
5th: 13 in Guinea, 3 in Liberia, and 14 in Sierra Leone.
110
 For that 
specific week, Liberia was doing relatively better than the other two 
countries. 
D. Nigeria 
The Ebola virus entered Lagos, Nigeria on July 20, 2014 through 
an infected Liberian air traveler who died 5 days later.
111
 At the airport 
he was noticeably very ill, lying on the floor of the departure gate 
while waiting to board the flight.
112
 He vomited during the flight, 
when he arrived, and finally in a car that delivered him to a private 
                                                 
105
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hospital.
113
 As could be expected, tragedy soon followed; the protocol 
officer who escorted him later died from Ebola.
114
 
While being triaged at the hospital, the patient had told the staff 
that he had malaria, and denied contact with any Ebola patient.
115
 The 
staff later learned that his sister’s body had carried a confirmed case of 
Ebola and she had died from the disease in Liberia.
116
 The traveler had 
visited his sister while she was in the hospital and attended her 
funeral.
117
 Because malaria is not transmitted from person to person, 
no staff at the hospital was on alert for Ebola or took even protective 
precautions against the disease.
118
 Over the next few days, nine doctors 
and nurses became infected, and four of these nine died.
119
 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, and the number of 
people living in Lagos alone is about 21 million, almost as large as the 
populations of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone combined.
120
 
Because thousands of people move in and out of Lagos every day, 
with frequent gridlocks of traffic, the carrying out, or “contact 
tracing,” under such conditions is unimaginable.
121
 This was the main 
concern raised shortly after the first case was confirmed and 
announced.
122
 The United States Consul General in Nigeria, Jeffrey 
Hawkins, said at the time: “The last thing anyone in the world wants to 
hear is the 2 words, ‘Ebola’ and ‘Lagos’ in the same sentence.”
123
 
These words conjured images of an “apocalyptic urban outbreak.”
124
 
Luckily, this was not the case, as the Nigerian government in 
conjunction with WHO, the CDC, and other similar bodies reached a 
100% tracing of known contacts in Lagos, and a 99.8% tracing at the 
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second outbreak site in Port Harcourt.
125
 Reportedly, the Nigerian 
Federal and State governments are said to have provided ample 
financial and material resources, coupled with well-trained and 
experienced national staff, to handle the outbreak.
126
 It is worth noting 
that earlier in the year, WHO confirmed that Nigeria had eradicated 
guinea-worm disease, another spectacular success story, as well as 




Mali’s Ministry of Health notified WHO on October 23, 2014, of a 
laboratory-confirmed case of infection with EVD.
128
 This was the first 
discovered EVD case in Mali.
129
 
The case involved a 2-year-old female who developed symptoms 
on October 19, 2014 while in Beuila, Guinea, and then travelled by 
road to Mali.
130
 On October 20, 2014, she was admitted to a healthcare 
facility in Kayes, Mali.
131
 The next day, she was referred to the 
Fousseyni Daou Hospital in Kayes.
132
 On October 22, 2014 samples 
for EVD were taken and analyzed at the Center for TB and AIDS 
Research in Mali.
133
 The results came back positive for EVD.
134
 The 
test results were confirmed at confirmed at the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) in Atlanta and at the Institute Pasteur 
                                                 
125
 Id. Unlike the situation in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, all identified 
contacts were physically monitored on a daily basis for 21 days. Id. The few 
contacts who attempted to escape the monitoring system were all diligently 
tracked, using special intervention teams, and returned to medical observation in 
order to complete the requisite monitoring period of 21 days. Id. 
126
 Id. Great epidemiological detective work would eventually link every single one 
of the country’s 19 confirmed cases back to direct or indirect contact with that 
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de Dakar Senegal.
135
 The patient died on October 24, 2014.
136
 Eighty-




On August 30, 2014, Senegal’s Ministry of Public Health and 
Social Affairs informed WHO about a case of EVD announced in that 
country on the 29th of that month.
138
 This involved a 21-year-old male 
native of Guinea who came to Dakar by road on August 20th, and 
stayed with relatives at a home in the borders of the city.
139
 On August 
23rd, he sought medical care for symptoms that included fever, 
diarrhea, and vomiting.
140
 He received treatment for malaria, but did 
not improve and left the facility.
141
 After leaving the facility, he 
continued to reside with his relatives; but on August 26th, he was 
referred to a specialized facility for infectious diseases still showing 
similar symptoms and was hospitalized.
142
 WHO treated this first case 
in Senegal as a top priority emergency case.
143
 
Key operational personnel were consequently dispatched to Dakar 
to help confine the disease and stop its spread.
144
 
G. The United States 
Three cases of the outbreak in the United States occurred within 
the timeline indicated below. 
On September 30, 2014, the CDC confirmed the first laboratory-
confirmed case of Ebola diagnosed in the United States in a man who 
had traveled to Dallas, Texas from Liberia.
145
 This man, Mr. Duncan, 
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did not show symptoms when he left Liberia, but subsequently 
developed symptoms about four days after arriving in the United 
States.
146
 Mr. Duncan then sought medical care at Texas Presbyterian 
Hospital of Dallas, but did so only after developing signs consistent 
with Ebola.
147
 Because of his travel history and symptoms, the CDC 
recommended testing him for Ebola.
148
 The medical facility then 
isolated the patient, and sent his specimen for testing at the CDC and 
also at a Texas laboratory.
149




Then, on October 15, 2014, a healthcare worker who provided care 
for Mr. Duncan tested positive for Ebola at Texas Presbyterian 
Hospital.
151
 This healthcare worker was transferred to Emory Hospital 
in Atlanta, Georgia.
152
 Because the healthcare worker had traveled by 
air from Dallas to Cleveland on October 10, and from Cleveland to 
Dallas on October 13, the CDC followed up to ensure that all 
passengers and crew members on both flights were contacted by public 
health professionals to answer questions, and to arrange follow-ups as 
necessary.
153
 Fortunately, the patient recovered and was discharged on 
October 28th.
154
 By November 3rd all passengers on either flight 
completed the twenty-one day monitoring period.
155
 
On October 23, 2014, the New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene reported a case of Ebola in a medical aid worker 
who had served with Doctors without Borders in Guinea and returned 
to New York City.
156
 The CDC confirmed the diagnosis on October 












 Id. Local public health officials identified all close contacts of the index patient 
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24th.
157
 Fortunately, the patient recovered and was discharged from 
Bellevue Hospital Center on November 11, 2014.
158
 
Once the first laboratory-confirmed Ebola case was reported in the 
United States, one could immediately see the difference between the 
United States (the West) and Africa in coping with this outbreak. As 
aptly stated by CDC Director Dr. Tom Frieden: “Ebola can be 
scary. But there’s all the difference in the world between the U.S. and 
parts of Africa where Ebola is spreading. The United States has a 
strong health care system and public health professionals who will 
make sure this case does not threaten our communities.”
159 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS OF PATIENTS AND WORKERS VERSUS 
PROTECTING SPREAD OF DISEASE 
A. Siracusa Principle 
The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) was developed in Siracusa, Italy, in 1984.
160
 A historical 
background indicating the rationale at the time behind the Siracusa 
principles should be insightful. 
In the 1970s, there was an international “epidemic” of state 
emergencies that resulted in political unrest in countries like 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Ireland, Malaysia, and 






 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC and Texas Health 




 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation 
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4672bc122.html [https://perma.cc/NJG7-PQ6P]. 
This international conference was held in Siracusa, Italy from April 30 to May 
4, 1984. Id. The gathering was sponsored by the International Commission of 
Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, the American Association 
for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute of 
Human Rights, and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal 
Sciences. Id. 
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Pakistan.
161
 These state emergencies occurred against the backdrop of 
the Cold War, where those who did not agree with the national 
government of their countries were often labelled as dissidents, agents 
of an international enemy, and/or as threats to national security.
162
 The 
national security doctrine, which, within the definition of security 
includes the ability of a state to defend against external and internal 
aggression and rebellion, came about as a result of such practices.
163
 
As such, the Siracusa Principles were conscripted in response to 
concerns about the violation of individual human rights that could 
occur when a state acts to protect the public good, but however, limits 
the rights of individuals.
164
 While it is important to respect and 
preserve the ‘rule of law’ under such circumstances, while also 
protecting the human rights of others, there are interpretive difficulties 
as to the protection of human rights during state emergencies. Firstly, 
there is the understanding of many governments that in times of crises, 
they are free from any form of control and therefore could have 
recourse to any means deemed necessary to deal with such crises.
165
 
Secondly, some governments do not think that international 
humanitarian covenants are applicable in cases where the conflict is 
completely internal, and consequently there is no officially declared 
war under such circumstances.
166
 
The Siracusa Principles can be interpreted as trying to ensure 
careful consideration in balancing the rights of the individual against 
the state’s interest in ensuring the well-being of the larger 
population.
167
 The International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights permits states to derogate from certain human rights 
                                                 
161
 Sara Abiola, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): 
















 Id. at 7. 
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obligations, but however, while subject to certain conditions. Art. 4 of 
the ICCPR provides that: 
“In times of public emergency which threatens the life 
of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed, the state parties to the present Covenant 
may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation provided that 
such measure are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not involve 
discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, 
language, religion or social origin.”
168
 
Most human rights treaties envisage a system of derogations that 
allows state parties to vary their obligations temporarily under the 
treaty in extraordinary circumstances that are in times of public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation.
169
 Therefore, the 
derogation regime aims at striking a balance between the protection of 
individual human rights and the protection of national needs in times 
of crises, and does so by placing reasonable limits on emergency 
powers.
170
 The Siracusa Principles on the limitations and derogation 
provisions of the ICCPR provide guidelines for the rationalization of 
limitations of ICCPR rights. So, whenever a limitation is required in 
terms of the Covenant, it has to be necessary.
171
 This term implies that 
the limitation: 
                                                 
168
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 174. 
169
 Tahmina Karimova, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Situations of 
Emergency, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in 
SituProject, http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_
emergency.php [https://perma.cc/76N6-6HH7] (last visited September 15, 2016)
. Different states may be subject to different emergency derogation regimes, and 
depending on the state’s adherence to the particular treaty derogation rights may 
vary from treaty to treaty. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American 
Convention of Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. 
170
 Karimova, supra note 169. 
171
 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, AMERICAN ASS’N FOR THE 
INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, 6 (1985),  http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
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. . . be based on one of the grounds justifying limitations 
recognized by the relevant article of the Covenant; 
Responds to a pressing public or social need; Pursues a 
legitimate aim; Is proportionate to that aim and any 
assessment as to the necessity of a limitation should be 
made on objective considerations.
172
 
In the context of limitations in light of public health, the Siracusa 
Principles necessitate that any measures that limit individual human 
rights be: 1) provided for and carried out in accordance with law, 2) 
directed toward a legitimate objective of general interest, 3) strictly 
necessary in a democratic society to achieve the objective, 4) be least 
intrusive and restrictive to achieve the objective, 5) be based on 
scientific evidence, 6) be neither arbitrary nor discriminatory in 
application and of limited duration, 7) be respectful of human dignity, 
and 8) be subject to review.
173
 Consequently, public health may be 
invoked as grounds for limiting certain rights in order to let a state take 
measures to deal with a serious threat to the health of its population as 
a whole, or the individual members of its population.
174
 Such measures 
must be specifically aimed at preventing disease or injury, or 
providing care for the sick or injured.
175
 In so doing, due regard must 




                                                                                                                   
content/uploads/1984/07/Siracusa-principles-ICCPR-legal-submission-1985-
eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CSY-Y3XY] . 
172
 Id. Furthermore, the Siracusa Principles state the following regarding the 
limitations: In applying a limitation, a state shall use no more restrictive means 
than are required for the achievement of the purpose of the limitation . . . [t]he 
burden of justifying a limitation upon a right guaranteed under the Covenant lies 
with the state . . . [t]he requirement expressed in Article 12 of the Covenant that 
any restrictions be consistent with other rights recognized in the Covenant is 
implicit in limitations to the other rights recognized in the Covenant. . . . [t]he 
limitation clauses of the Covenant shall not be interpreted to restrict the exercise 
of any human rights protected to a greater extent by other international 
obligations binding upon the state. Id.  
173
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 In order to activate the derogation clause, there must be the 
existence of a situation that amounts to a public emergency.
177
 
According to the Human Rights Commission (HRC): [n]ot every 
disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation.
178
 The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) qualified the time of public emergency as: “an 
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which afflicts the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the 
community of which the community is composed.”
179
 
Public health cases can exemplify the application of the Siracusa 
Principles,
180
 primarily in the realm of infectious disease control, such 
as was the case with the multidrug resistant TB, the pandemic 
influenza, SARS, and HIV/AIDS, and now with Ebola, situations that 
will press states to derogate. Were the Siracusa Principles 
appropriately applied in the case of Ebola outbreak? 
B. Human Rights and Quarantine of Ebola Patients 
Freedom of movement is a human right that should only be limited 
in extreme circumstances.
181
 The compulsory quarantine of a patient 
suspected of having an infectious disease should only be a measure of 
last resort, and should actually be undertaken only after voluntary 
measures to isolate the patient have failed.
182
 
Meddling with the freedom of movement when instituting 
quarantine or isolation for a communicable disease such as Ebola, 
MDR-TB, and XDR-TB may be necessary for the public good, and 
                                                 
177
 Karimova, supra note 169, at 1. 
178
 See id. at 3. Absent a specific definition of “public emergency” in the ICCPR 
and the European Commission on Human Rights (“ECHR”), interpretations of 
the meaning and scope of the phrase were provided by the Human Rights 
Commission (HRC) and jurisprudence of the ECHR. Id. 
179
 Id. See also Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1961). 
180
 See generally Karimova, supra note 169. It is no stretch of the imagination, 
especially in light of the most recent outbreak of Ebola, to see that any epidemic 
sufficiently pervasive can press the boundaries and either fall short of or exceed 
the line of “public emergency”, and therefore see that these are situations that 
demand further analysis for their human rights implications. 
181
 See WHO Guidance On Human Rights and Involuntary Detention For xdr-tb 
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However, the key factor in determining if necessary protections 
exist when rights are restricted is that each one of the five criteria of 
the Siracusa Principles point (6) must be met, albeit in a limited 
fashion and subject to review and appeal.
184
 The Siracusa Principles 
require that: 
[1)] The restriction [be] provided for and carried out in 
accordance with the law; . . . [2)] The restriction [be] 
in the interest of a legitimate objective of general 
interest; . . . [3)] The restriction [be] strictly necessary 
in a democratic society to achieve the objective;. . . [4) 
That t]here [be] no less intrusive and restrictive means 
available to reach the same objective;. . . [and 5) That 
t]he restriction [be] based on scientific evidence and 
not drafted or imposed arbitrarily i.e. in an 
unreasonable or otherwise discriminatory manner.
185
 
The main question becomes: Were the above principles observed during 
the quarantines that took place throughout the Ebola outbreak of 2014? 
Even though different circumstances may exist in relation to 
quarantines between the three West African countries that have been 
worst hit by the virus (Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone),
186
 all three 
countries imposed quarantines at various points in time in an effort to 
control the further spread of the disease.
187
 In Guinea, for example, 




 See Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 




 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19. In his July 30 broadcast to the 
nation, and then on August 7, Sierra Leone’s President Koroma announced a 
state of emergency and a number of measures to respond to the crisis under 
section 29(5) of the 1991 constitution. Id. These measures, which were to be 
taken for 60 to 90 days, included quarantines in all epicenters of the disease 
enforced by the police; and the protection of health workers and centers by the 
police and the military. Id. The president also called on local leaders and chiefs 
to establish by-laws that would complement other efforts to deal with the 
disease. Id. 
187
 See Fiona Lander, Human Rights and Ebola: The Issue of Quarantine, 
TRANSNATIONAL GLOBAL HEALTH (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://blogs.plos.org/globalhealth/2014/11/ebola_and_human_rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/6KVS-5AM3]. 
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President Condé declared on state television a national public health 
emergency.
188
 The measures that the president announced included the 
institution of a quarantine enforced by health workers and security 
forces of anyone suspected of having the disease until test results were 
obtained.
189
 The president further stated that “[a]nyone who blocks or 
incites someone to block in any way the detection, isolation treatment, 
or examination of a sick person, of a suspect case or contact will be 




In Sierra Leone, the government imposed a quarantine for three 
days (from September 19 to September 21, 2014), requiring: 
“everybody. . . to stay indoors as 7,000 teams of health and community 
workers went door to door to root out hidden Ebola patients.”
191
 This 
was essential, especially given that people were apparently keeping 
loved ones at home.
192
 As a government spokesman stated: “It’s clear 
that we have pockets of resistance, in terms of denial.”
193
 Although 
such methods of disease control may have been applauded by some as 
the best possible way to target hidden patients, international health 
organizations have generally been against such forced measures in 
fighting the epidemic.
194
 They argue that these methods add a punitive 
element to disease control, and increase hardships for the communities 
hardest hit by the virus, as well as undermine the needed trust and 
cooperation that is necessary.
195
 Doctors Without Borders had been 
working within the region and warned that lockdown could exacerbate 
the problem: “It has been our experience that lockdowns and 
quarantines do not help control Ebola, as they end up driving people 
underground and jeopardizing the trust between people and health 
                                                 
188
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providers.”
196
 On the other hand, a United Nations official supported 
the idea of traveling house-to-house.
197
 Roeland Monash, a UNICEF 
Representative agreed stating the fight will be won by traveling house-
to-house to stop transmission, rather than at an Ebola clinic.
198
 
By the same vein, the decision by several states in the United 
States, including Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, to 
impose a mandatory quarantine on healthcare workers, who happened 
to be mostly volunteers returning from the three countries in West 
Africa, was met with some resistance.
199
 The quarantine caused an 
unnecessary hardship on people, for example with returning nurse Ms. 
Kaci Hickox, Ms. Hickox had been caring for Ebola patients in 
association with Doctors Without Borders in Sierra Leone.
200
 The 
quarantine order often sends the wrong message instead of the 
important information about the transmission of the virus, namely that 
it is transmitted by someone who is symptomatic and can only be 
transmitted through direct contact with bodily fluids such as blood.
201
 
Ms. Hickox, after arriving at Newark Liberty Airport in New 
Jersey, and after a seven-hour wait at the hospital, was put in an 
isolation tent inside University Hospital in Newark that was poorly 
heated and with no running shower or toilet.
202
 
Twice, Ms. Hickox tested negative for Ebola, including under a 
test at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta.
203
 
Hickox, who told CNN that her “basic human rights have been 








 See Vesna Jaksic, States Should Not Issue Blanket Quarantine Orders for 
Medical Workers Returning from Ebola-Stricken Countries, Physicians for 





 Ebola Nurse Claims Forced Quarantine Violates Her Human Rights, CNN 
WIRE (Oct. 26, 2014), http://kdvr.com/2014/10/26/ebola-nurse-claims-forced-
quarantine-violates-her-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/CAC9-5LWY] 
[hereinafter CNN WIRE]. Id. 
201
 See Jaksic, supra note 199. 
202
 CNN WIRE, supra note 200. 
203
 Id. 
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violated,” was released two days after testing negative for Ebola.
204
 
The coercive mandatory quarantine of Kaci Hickox was criticized as 
“heavy-handed and draconian.”
205
 On the other hand, the Governor of 
New Jersey, Chris Christie, said on Fox News that he had “no second 
thoughts” about New Jersey’s mandatory quarantine for health care 
workers.
206
 He continued: “I believe that folks who want to take that 
step and are willing to volunteer also understand that it’s in their 
interest and the public health interest to have a 21-day period 
thereafter if they’ve been directly exposed to people with the virus.”
207
 
The Governor also stated he did not believe that a voluntary system of 
quarantine could be reliable.. According to him, “[quarantine] is the 
government’s job.”
208
 Ms. Hickox retorted by stating that mandatory 
quarantine is “not a sound public health decision,” and that she 
believes that public health officials and not politicians should be 
making policies pertaining to Ebola and public safety.
209
 
Is it legal for the US government to quarantine individuals, or 
groups of people?
210
 Although the West African epidemic demands 
stringent measures to prevent the further spread of the virus 
                                                 
204















 Mak, supra note 204. New quarantine regulations were proposed in 2005, amid 
fears of the pandemic flu and bioterrorism. Id. Under those rules, the airlines 
were required to keep records that would allow health officials to keep track of 
passengers. Id. The concept of a “provisional quarantine” would have permitted 
the federal government to detain individuals for up to three days, with no 
method for appeal, if the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention believed 
that a person was infected with certain illnesses. Id. This didn’t work, as people 
were so uncomfortable about the answers to questions posed that they decided 
not to answer them at all. Id. The rules were withdrawn in 2010 by the Obama 
administration after civil-liberties organizations protested, and airlines 
complained about compliance costs. Id. The federal government tends to be 
responsible for quarantining individuals traveling from outside the United 
States, or even between states; by contrast, state and local governments 
apparently have control over individuals who are traveling only locally. Id. 
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which may and should include imposition of quarantine protocols that 
comply with international law, it is trite to say that the quarantine 
protocols for returning health workers introduced in New Jersey, and 
amongst other States, were not justifiable under international law, and 
more importantly, that they were not sustained by scientific 
evidence.
211
 Consequently, the adoption of “overly-broad quarantines 
and other abusive measures can undermine efforts to contain the Ebola 
epidemic.”
212
 A better and preferable approach would be to “ensure 
that people have access to health information and care.”
213
 Only if and 
when such limits are unquestionably necessary and based upon 
protections delineated under international human rights law should 
restrictions on liberty or movement be imposed upon civilians.
214
 
C. Gender Discrimination and Ebola 
Although different epidemics affect populations in different ways, 
“the gender disparities documented in countries affected by West 
Africa’s Ebola outbreak are actually the norm during disasters across 
the globe.”
215
 By August 2014, approximately 55–60% of all Ebola 
fatalities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were women.
216
 
According to one Liberian minister at an Ebola task force meeting, 
health teams had reported that as much as 75% of Ebola victims were 
women..
217
 Globally, “women and children are 14 times more likely to 
die in a disaster than are men.”
218
 Looking at HIV/AIDS as another 
example of an infectious disease, one can see that women in Africa are 
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also disproportionately affected in relation to men.
219
 Sub-Saharan 
Africa has the most serious HIV and AIDS epidemic in the entire 
globe.
220
 In 2013, roughly 25 million HIV infected persons, or 70% of 
the world’s infected, were living in the region.
221
 In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, like in many parts of the world, the HIV epidemic 
disproportionately affects women due to social and economic 
inequalities present.
222
 However, Ebola differs significantly from HIV 
in that the risk in transmitting Ebola is “present in day to-day 
interaction”, while HIV is more difficult to transmit.
223
 In fear of an 
increased possibility of infection posed by Ebola, there were calls for 
limitations on international travel from the countries impacted by the 
outbreak, namely for denying infected person’s entry into countries 
where they could receive high quality medical treatment.
224
 This is 
likely the reason why during the outbreak, Senegal closed its borders 
with Guinea, and President Ellen Sirleaf closed most of Liberia’s 
borders, both nations attempting to contain this contagious virus.
225
 
The traditional gender roles played by women in West Africa 
makes them more vulnerable to Ebola infection.
226
 For example, the 
women are generally the caregivers of the family and therefore tend to 
the sick, and in the lethal cases of Ebola, would logically be the ones 
to perform funeral rites like washing bodies and preparing them for 
burial.
227
 Likewise, as caregivers and providers, they would engage in 
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 Id. Guinea and Sierra Leone did the same. Kenya, South Africa and others in the 
region also limited travel to and from the areas. Id. 
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activities and occupations such as carrying out cross-border trading, 
health work, and serving as traditional birth attendants.
228
 
Unfortunately, these realities place women at a greater risk of 
coming into contact with EVD.
229
 Likewise, because “information 
remains a powerful weapon”, sociocultural intensive barriers to 
“women’s access to appropriate health information” have worsened 
the susceptibility of women to Ebola.
230
 Discrepancies in the ability of 
men and women to access information stems largely from gender 
inequalities in literacy and secondary education.
231
 “[The] inadequate 
provision of gender-sensitive information continues to pose threats to 
ending the proliferation of disease.”
232
 As exemplified by the many 
years of HIV/AIDS epidemic, the gender gap in the rate of infection 
between men and woman is invariably reflected by the difference in 
access to health information, and arguably widens the gender gap even 
more.
233
 Other factors that contribute to women’s vulnerability include 
“rigid gender role expectations, gendered poverty, and the influence of 
‘boy preference’” on the allotment of education, nutrition, and other 
vital resources.
234
 Women more often than not face social and cultural 
exclusions that “inhibit their ability to respond effectively in crises.”
235
 
While one can’t predict or prevent all future epidemics, one can 
certainly change the way women are affected by them, and hopefully 
limit the level of uncalled-for suffering involved.
236
 Some good policy 
guidelines and recommendations to take into consideration by 
governments and relief agencies relating to the role of gender during a 
crisis like Ebola include: 
[1)] Including women in strategizing when assessing 
the scope of problems and designing responses. . . [2)] 
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woman can easily bathe him, but the man cannot do so [for the woman].” Id. 
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care of the women.”). 
236
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Ensuring equal distribution of care, facilities, aid and 
other resources. . . [3)] Raising the overall status of 
girls and women so that they are well-fed, educated and 
can work. . . [5)] Investing in programs that challenge 
social attitudes leading to boy preferences and gross 
imbalances in care and work.
237
 
D. The Rights to Information 
In an effort to control and safeguard their reputation, the 
governments of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were said to have 
been curtailing freedom of expression especially with regards to the 
Press, thereby regulating the Ebola crisis information outbreak in a 
manner that protected the government.
238
 Given that journalists are 
often key disseminators of public health education information, such 
government restrictions tend to compromise people’s access to timely, 
accurate information about Ebola, which in turn leads to ignorance and 
consequently to fear about the disease.
239
 Yet, the right to health as 
codified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) depends on access to health information, 
which is an important determinant of health.
240
 In fact, under the 
ICESCR, state parties are required to take steps essential for “[t]he 
prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases.”
241
 This at the very minimum requires states to 
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provide access to vital information on preventing and controlling the 
main health problems in the community.
242
 
Nongovernmental organizations, local newspapers, and community 
radio, have and will continue to play a key role in public health 
education.
243
 In Liberia, the Civil Society Organization’s Ebola 
Response Task Force produced clear messages about how the virus is 
transmitted and about how to prevent the disease, in local languages, 
while also “using the voices of traditional and religious leaders that 
have aired on 44 community-based radio stations.”
244
 The plans of the 
Task Force to establish a “situation room” for monitoring the Liberian 
government’s response to the Ebola crisis, including accountability in 
the use of resources by the National Task Force and the access to 
health facilities, was commendable.
245
 In Sierra Leone’s Kailahun 
district, one of the epicenters of the outbreak near the border with 
Liberia and Guinea, a local community radio station, Radio MOA, in 
conjunction with other community-based organizations, formed their 
own Ebola Response Task Force and “organized a campaign to combat 
the rumors that were undermining the medical response.”
246
 They 
transmitted interviews with health experts, officials, and Ebola 




UNESCO has been quite instrumental in disseminating 
information to fight Ebola through the media.
248
 Following the United 
Nation’s unanimous adoption of the General Assembly’s resolution 
69/1 on September 19, 2014, and the adoption of the Security 
Council’s resolution 2177 in 2014, to stop the Ebola outbreak, 
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 See Irina Bokova, Foreword to UNITED NATIONS EDUC. SCIENTIFIC AND 
CULTURAL ORG., UNESCO’S RESPONSE TO EBOLA, (Dec. 2014), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002311/231158e.pdf 
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UNESCO launched a media project in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
249
 . 
“The provision of clear and reliable information is essential for a better 
understanding of the disease at the community level and as a bulwark 
for more effective prevention.”
250
 Thus, by communicating risk 
factors, methods of prevention, and approaches for safe intervention to 
the people, the UNESCO project has sought to reinforce the 
governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia in their respective fights to 
prevent the spread of the disease.
251
 Strengthening prevention in order 
to suspend the further spread of the disease starts with “clear, 
accessible, and reliable information provided to people in all districts 
and counties,” said the Director-General, Irina Bokova.
252
 “Stopping 
Ebola requires effective action by individual women and men, at the 
community level, and this project will help us reach and support 
them.”
253
 International advocacy is therefore vital in transforming 
negative media accounts about Ebola into objective and realistic ones 
that reflect malleability and are balanced with role-model stories.
254
 
IV. THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The criticisms levied against the international community for being 
lukewarm towards the Ebola outbreak in Africa are not unfounded.
255
 
Given the lack of investment in the health care systems of the three 
hardest hit countries in West Africa [Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea] investment that requires domestic political will and resources 
from the international community – the spread of Ebola was 
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inevitable. Major missteps by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the delayed and frankly indifferent response of wealthier countries 
have exacerbated the situation. It is worth repeating: people in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea are dying of poverty.
256
 
Gaffes by organizations like WHO, and the slow and indifferent 
responses from First World countries, initially made the situation 
worse.
257
 Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anan echoed 
this sentiment aptly when he described himself as “bitterly 
disappointed” in an international response that “lacked luster at best” 
and was “counter-productive at worse.”
258
 
It seemed that rather than selecting and treating those with the 
disease in order to avert further transmission, “developed countries 
seemed to have been more concerned with preventing Ebola from 
spreading outside of West Africa.”
259
 This sent the message that the 
new normal in epidemic response is for “developed countries [just to] 
do their best to keep their walls up and outsiders at bay.”
260
 
Because the international response to the Ebola crisis in West 
Africa has been slow and uneven, it inevitably left the local people, 
local governments, and on site NGOs to do most of the practical (and 
most dangerous), hands-on work.
261
 Doctors Without Borders, also 
known as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), called for states with 
“biological-disaster response capacity to urgently dispatch human and 
material resources to West Africa,” and, after about three months, the 
international community had in fact gave at least some form of 
assistance to the three worst hit countries in the region, although it was 








 Id. Most governments were only taking “action commensurate with the extent of 
the crisis when Ebola cases were identified in the Western world.” Id. That is 
why a country like Cuba, despite having suffered crippling effects from the 
decades-old economic sanctions by the United States, has nonetheless been 
applauded as a “leader in responding to the crisis” for their quick, 
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still limited to very particular sorts of assistance.
262
 The wealthy 
foreign governments focused mainly on financing or building Ebola 
case management structures, which, while nonetheless vital, left the 
staffing of the facilities to national authorities, local health care staff, 
and NGOs that lacked the required expertise.
263
 As would be expected, 
this was not sufficiently helpful, especially at such a precarious time 
and under the circumstances surrounding such a threat of disease, a 
threat to lives without regard for borders: “How is it that the 
international community has left the response to Ebola—now a 
transnational threat—to doctors, nurses and charity workers?”
264
 The 
cry was loud and clear when Doctors without Borders in Liberia cried 
out that they had exhausted their available pool of experienced medical 
staff and could not scale up their response any further: “We 
desperately need WHO, countries, and other aid agencies to deploy 
staff to the field. We are Doctors Without Borders but not without 
limits.”
265
 There was a “lack of adequate facilities for isolating and 
diagnosing patients where they were needed most.”
266
 This was 
especially so given that wherever there were new cases, an all-out 
response had to be put into motion, while simultaneously expecting 
local people, governments, and NGOs to be flexible in their approach, 
adding to the already mounting pressures on health care workers to 
have to carry out utility calculations of who needs the most, where, 
and when, with people’s lives hanging in the balance.
267
 
Taking a closer look at some activities of the international community 
through the framework of WHO, the African Union, and the CDC should 
help shed some light regarding what they did or are currently doing to curtail 
the spread of Ebola and put affected African countries and the rest of the 
international community in a better position than they were in 2014. 
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A. WHO 
WHO has been criticized for its initial handling of the Ebola outbreak. 
Therefore, taking a look at how WHO handled the outbreak would be helpful 
in understanding whether indeed it was effective or flawed in its response to 
a major epidemic under the circumstances they faced with the resources at 
their disposal. 
WHO graded the initial Ebola outbreak in Guinea and Liberia as a 
Level 2 event according to its Emergency Response Framework 
(“ERF”).
268
 The Level 2 designation directs the WHO “to provide 
moderate support to the affected countries.”
269
 However, this level was 
increased to a Level 3 event on July 24, 2014, the Director-General of 
WHO realizing that the increasing severity of the outbreak in Guinea 
and Liberia required a more expansive response, and also based on the 
fact that the outbreak had seemingly spread to another nation: 
Nigeria.
270
 By initiating the Level 3 event designation, WHO’s 




With the intensity of the outbreak, WHO, together with affected 
countries, launched the Ebola Virus Disease Response Plan for the 
period running from July to December 2014.
272
 In an effort to rapidly 
prevent further spread of EVD in West Africa, WHO convened a 
special ministerial meeting on the outbreak.
273
 The meeting, which 
was held on July 2–3, 2014 in Accra, Ghana, brought together 
Ministers of Health and senior health officials from 11 African 
nations;
274
 it also brought together stakeholders in the affected regions, 
including Ebola survivors, representatives of airlines and mining 
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companies, and donor communities, groups that could serve as critical 
response partners in the months to come.
275
 The Accra meeting 
secured a consensus of opinion amongst the participants that the WHO 
would “lead and coordinate the international response to the 
outbreak.”
276
 The objective of the meeting had been to secure an even 
greater consensus as to “the optimal way to interrupt the ongoing 
[Ebola] transmission [rates] in West Africa” and therefore minimize 
“the human, social, and economic impact of the current outbreak,” and 
in turn, to learn how to deal with any future outbreaks.
277
 This was 
arguably achieved, the outcome of this meeting being the Strategy for 
Accelerated Response to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, which 
declared the two important strategies that would be pursued: 1. “Stop 
transmission of Ebola virus disease in the affected countries through 
[the] scaling up [of] effective, evidence-based outbreak control 
measures. . . . [and; 2.] Prevent the spread of EVD to the neighboring 




The strategic plan involved establishing the Sub regional 
Operations Coordinating Centre (“SEOCC”), which is now located in 
Conakry, Guinea.
279
 The center is the main operations center for West 
Africa, and served as a coordinating platform during the crisis, 
bringing together WHO and its partners to “consolidate, harmonize, 
and streamline the technical support to affected countries.”
280
 WHO 








 Id. Based on the epidemiological profile of the Ebola virus outbreak, the strategy 
was built on the following three major pillars and associated activities: (1) 
Immediate outbreak response interventions, including: assessment; reduction of 
the spread of disease and effective measures to interrupt transmission of Ebola 
virus disease. . . (2) Enhancing coordination and collaboration, including: (a) 
Building on local, regional and national coordination. . . (b) Whole of society 
response (incl. potential legislative action, involvement of the military, as 
appropriate; public order maintenance;). . . (c) Proactive preparedness promotion 
in neighboring countries – including through social mobilization and training. . . 
(3) Scaling-up of human and financial resources mobilization, including:. . . (a) 
Communication and public engagement (e.g. sharing responsibility for 
preparedness and response; communication for the general public; sharing of 
data and information)... (b) Linking health and social care responses. Id. 
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and the Regional Office for Africa continue to “coordinate 
international and regional deployments and activities, respectively,” 
and provide additional capacity to the SEOCC.
281
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering many regional governments 
had declared the epidemic “national health emergenc[ies], each 
affected countries established a “National Task Force for Ebola 
Outbreak Response”.
282
 The three most affected countries have also 
organized a series of discussions to empower their respective National 
Task Forces to further develop response plans.
283
 The Governments of 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone implemented their respective 
national strategic plans for a quicker, and hopefully more effective 
response.
284
 The application of these operational plans over time have 
brought concrete improvements, and the scale up of effective outbreak 
containment measures is working, as recent statistics have shown that 
the Ebola outbreak has subsided.
285
 
Despite success, however, the future challenges facing the task 
forces and other WHO-based initiatives cannot be ignored. Major 
challenges contributing to the on-going outbreak include: 1) 
Inadequate understanding within communities of the Ebola virus 
disease, especially given this is the country’s first experience with 
Ebola; 2) lack of experience among healthcare workers and limited 
capacities for a rapid response; 3) high exposure to Ebola virus in the 
communities through household care and customary burial procedures, 
and the resulting high level of community deaths leading to panic and 
anxiety; 4) denial, distrust, and rejection of proposed public health 
interventions arising from misapprehension of the cause of the new 
disease; 5) fear of the disease by forefront health workers leading to 
either suboptimal care for patients or substandard implementation of 
protective measures; 6) close community ties and movement within 
and across borders has led to difficulties in the tracing and the 
following up of contacts for the three countries; and, 7) the scale and 
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the geographical extent of the outbreak in Sierra Leone, and Guinea, 
require significant and robust response capacities and structures.
286
 
B. The African Union 
Some have criticized or even accused, the African leaders for 
failing to do enough to address the Ebola health crisis.
287
 “Ebola has 
exposed the extreme weaknesses of our institutions as governments; 
countries which are affected were found totally unprepared,” said 
Graca Machel, Nelson Mandela’s widow.
288
 Similarly, the AU has 
been criticized for “waiting 10 months before holding an emergency 
summit on the outbreak.”
289
 However, according to the African Union, 
Africa’s efforts to tackle the Ebola crisis has been largely undermined 
or unnoticed in spite of the fact that Africans have taken the lead in 
providing forefront staff, and have shown themselves “better placed to 
fight infectious diseases in their continent than outsiders.”
290
 Dr. 
Olawale Maiyegun, the director of social affairs at the AU 
commission, said that despite the fact that Africans have shown both 
the willingness and ability to deal with Ebola, “the focus has been on 
the work of international agencies and those with the greatest media 
clout,” overshadowing the work of Africans. 
291
 He continued by 
pointing out that, “[u]nfortunately, Africans do not have the 
international voice of CNN, BBC and France 24, [and as a result,] 
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much of their work is overlooked in the western media.”
292
 According 
to the African Union, “[t]he success of African health workers – 
including the heroic health workers of Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea – shows one thing: African health workers are better placed to 
fight infectious diseases in their continent than outsiders.”
293
 So, what 
has the African Union done to assist in dealing with the Ebola 
outbreak and prevention? 
In its very first statement on the Ebola outbreak, the African Union 
expressed its “deep concern at the situation, and its full solidarity and 
support to the countries affected by this epidemic.”
294
 In April 2014, 
the AU began its response to the crisis; the first “African Ministers of 
Health Meeting”, was jointly convened by the African Union 
Commission (AUC) and the WHO in Luanda, Angola.
295
 The AU 
made a strong statement and appeal to its member states with 
experience in handling EVD to assist with the disease.
296
 The response 
was positive, given that some AU member states sent experts to the 
affected countries.
297
 Then, at its meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 
August 19, 2014, the AU also adopted several decisions on the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, and approved the “immediate deployment of 
an African Union-led Military and Civilian Humanitarian Mission, 
encompassing nurses, medical doctors, and other medical and 
paramedical personnel.”
298
 It also included military personnel, which 
is required “for the effectiveness and protection of the Mission.”
299
 
Following this decision was the formation of the ASEOWA team, a 
Strategic Task Force comprised of representatives from various AU 
departments, UN agencies, and partners.
300
 The ASEOWA Concept of 
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Operations (CONOPs) envisioned “having up to 1000 health workers 
in the field, on a rotational basis over the next six-month period,” 
namely from December 2014–May 2015; success would be measured 




An agreement to help create an African Center comparable to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was signed on Monday, 
April 13, 2015, between the United States and the African Union, 
embodying the United States’ commitment to promoting public health 
across Africa and global health security.
302
 According to the news 
release, “[t]he African CDC is scheduled to launch sometime this year 
with the creation of an African Surveillance and Response Unit.”
303
 
The plan is for the unit to “include an emergency operations center that 
can coordinate and staff future health emergency responses on the 
continent.”
304
 “Under the agreement, the U.S. CDC will provide the 
technical expertise for the new African unit, and advise on the future 
development of the institution.”
305
 
The AUC’s decision to quicken the establishment of the CDC in 
Africa, has prompted: (1) “a rapid assessment of all CDC-type existing 
centers in Africa;” (2) the organizing of “a meeting of the 
Multinational Task Force that was established in June 2014, at the 
insistence of the African Ministers of Health;” a task force which 
deliberated “the type of CDC to be established, its areas of focus, and 
the relevant partnerships to support its functions;” (3) the creation of 
“a comprehensive but concise roadmap for the establishment and 
functioning of the African CDC by mid-2015;” and (4) the inclusion of 
“legal, structural, and financial implications of the establishment and 
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Mission to the African Union, the US Center for Disease Control, the European 
Union, the African Humanitarian Action, and various Embassies who attend 




 See Robert Preidt, Healthday News, U.S. Agrees to Help Launch ‘African CDC’, 









2017 The Ebola Virus Prevention and Human Rights Implication 45 




So, although not perfect or even the utmost, much has been done 
and is still being done by the AU to deal with this deadly disease. 
Indeed, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States 
have responded relatively well to the crisis, with the AU deploying 
more than 835 African health workers to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea at the peak of the epidemic.
307
 There is truth in the following 
statement: “The people of the affected countries should be given credit 




C. The CDC 
The one-year anniversary of the CDC’s participation and response 
to the Ebola outbreak was on July 9, 2015.
309
 As soon as the CDC 
became aware of the outbreak, it dispatched a team of experts to 
Guinea.
310
 Although the number of outbreaks continues to subside, the 
CDC continues to monitor and maintain experts in the most affected 
regions.
311
 Between 2014 and 2015, the CDC dispatched more than a 
thousand employees to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
312
 Many of 
these workers have made the trip more than once.
313
 Others, still 
“[t]housands more, have also worked on the Ebola response from the 
CDC’s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, as well as from other areas in 
the United States, and from other countries around the world.”
314
 The 
CDC has, however, not responded alone, and in some cases has 
collaborated with partners, such as: “the ministries of health in West 
Africa, the World Health Organization, the CDC Foundation, or with 
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other agencies of the U.S. government; for example, with the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), Doctors Without 
Borders (MSF), and other non-for-profit organizations.”
315
 
In May of 2015, “more than a year after the outbreak began, the 
World Health Organization declared the end of the Ebola outbreak in 
Liberia,” and yet just a month later, another case of Ebola was 
reported.”
316
 However, “cases continue to be reported in Guinea and 
Sierra Leone” to this day.
317
 
The CDC’s work is not at an end. It “continues to work in West 
Africa with the goal of stopping new cases in affected countries and 
keeping them from spreading.”
318
 How is the CDC in collaboration 
with its other partners in effectively doing so? Briefly highlighting 
some of the ways in which they cooperate with such partners will help 
pinpoint to strategies that may be used in the case of a future outbreak. 
1. Protecting the Borders by Screening 
As shown by the way it permeated the various nations of West 
Africa, Ebola has “proven how easily infectious diseases can cross 
borders, land, rivers, and even oceans,” infecting far beyond wherever 
they first strike.
319
 The three most highly impacted West African 
countries generally have porous borders and a highly mobile 
population that enabled “the rapid spread of Ebola from its origin in 
Guinea.”
320
 In West Africa, border control measures are very much 
relaxed; “getting to another country could be as simple as taking a boat 
trip across a river.”
321
 This makes it easy for a disease such as Ebola to 
spread across countries, consequently complicating contact tracing. 
Therefore, the CDC works with airlines, airports, ministries of health, 
and other partners to “provide technical assistance for conducting exit 
screenings and travel restrictions in countries with Ebola.”
322
 










 See G.K. Ratnaprabha & S. Gagan, Commentary On: Ebola Haemorrhagic 
Fever in Sudan, 1976, 4 Annals of Community Health 14, 16, (2016). 
320




 Id. at 29. Exit screening helps to identify travelers who may have symptoms of 
Ebola, or who may have been exposed to Ebola, and thus prevent them from 
leaving a country until it is confirmed they are not sick. Id. 
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In the United States, the CDC required air travelers entering the 
country who have been in Guinea, Liberia, or Sierra Leone to undergo 
entry screening.
323
 As with exit screening, “entry screening helps to 
prevent the further spread of Ebola . . . by identifying travelers who 
may be sick with Ebola or may have had exposure to Ebola and by 
ensuring. . . travelers are directed to appropriate medical care.”
324
 
2. Mobilizing Laboratories 
The CDC attempts to set up labs close to treatment centers.
325
 
Ebola treatment centers are no exception, and are usually run by 
MSF.
326
 Staff at treatment centers are formed into contact tracing 
teams that work to find individuals who have been exposed to patients 
with Ebola.
327
 Should those people develop Ebola symptoms during a 
twenty-one day monitoring period, they are brought back to the 
treatment centers where “healthcare workers wearing personal 
protective gear carefully take a blood sample and send it to the lab.”
328
 




 See id. However, as of June 17, 2015, entry screening changed for travelers 
coming to the United States from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Id. at 34. 
These travelers will continue to enter through one of five U.S. airports: New 
York JFK International Airport, Washington-Dulles International Airport, 
Newark International Airport, Chicago O’Hare International Airport, and 
Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. Id. Because the Ebola outbreak 
in Liberia is now virtually over, CDC no longer recommends active monitoring 
for those travelers arriving in the United States from Liberia. CDC, Questions 
and Answers: 2014 Ebola Outbreak, Ctrs. for Disease Control, (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/qa.html 
[https://perma.cc/4RXF-JUR8]. Notwithstanding entry travelers will still have 
their temperatures taken and be asked questions about travel history and possible 
exposures to Ebola, as well as provide their contact information so that the 
health department at their destination can connect with them, if needed. See 
CDC, Road to Zero, supra note 309, at 34. Travelers still undergo exit screening 
before departing from Liberia. Id. Entry screening and monitoring is not 
changed for travelers entering the United States from Guinea or Sierra Leone –
this includes travelers from Liberia who have also traveled to either Guinea or 
Sierra Leone within the past 21 days. Id. 
325
 Mobilizing Laboratories, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/about/ebola/mobilizing-laboratories.html (last visited Dec. 
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This is important, given that “early and accurate testing is critical” to 
preventing unnecessary spread.
329
 This CDC intervention is clear 
evidence that “an effective lab infrastructure . . . is essential for 
countries to rapidly detect and contain [EVD]”.
330
 
3. Strengthening Health Care to Prevent Infections 
Effective infection control can be achieved only with an 
empowered healthcare system, which will in turn, “protect 
communities and the healthcare workers who serve them.”
331
 Prior to 
this most recent outbreak of Ebola, “infection control in health 
facilities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone was often minimal at 
best,” and “[t]he fragile healthcare systems added to a rapid spread of 
the virus, and made it difficult to contain the epidemic.”
332
 In addition, 
“community behaviors needed to change to prevent people from 




On-the-ground training and health care education aimed at 
reducing the spread of the disease was provided.
334
 Microplanning 
sessions with a focus “on the early detection and safe isolation of 
patients, safe burials, and infection control in health care settings” 
were hosted by the CDC in Liberia.
335
 As a result of such experiences, 
“when the first case of Ebola was diagnosed in the United States, the 
                                                 
329
 See id. Should the sample test negative, “the patient is referred to a non-Ebola 
clinic for diagnosis and treatment as well as for follow-up testing.” Id. “If the 
sample tests positive, then the patient is isolated in a treatment center.” Id. 
Because patients who survive Ebola must eventually leave the treatment center, 
that happens only when their bodies have cleared the virus and the lab test 
comes back negative. Id. 
330
 Id. “When lab responders arrived in Liberia and Sierra Leone . . . they quickly 
set up mobile labs in both countries.” Id. CDC runs a lab in Bo, Sierra Leone, 
and has jointly run another lab in Liberia with the National Institutes of Health, 
and currently supports labs in Liberia along with the U.S. Department of 
Defense. Id. 
331
 See Strengthening Health Care and Preventing Infections, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/about/ebola/strengthening-
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CDC worked to tighten infection control procedures.”
336
 With the 
insights garnered from these innovative sessions and the direct 
experience of handling the EVD epidemic in Africa, the CDC has been 
able to “improve the preparation of healthcare workers and hospitals 
around” the United States as well.
337
 
4. Burying the Dead 
Another plight that comes with an Ebola outbreak is the need to 
bury the dead.
338
 However, “this cannot be done casually because 
corpses are one of the most infectious things. . ..”
339
 “If you come into 
contact with the dead body of an Ebola victim, you are very likely to 
get Ebola yourself.”
340
 Training others to bury dead is a necessity, 
therefore, to prevent infections to themselves and others.
341
 In pursuit 
of this end, “people are trained how to put on protective suites, masks, 
goggles, and gloves; how to collect bodies; how to wrap the corpses; 
and how to bury them.”
342
 It was very difficult for responders “to 
convince families that taking their loved ones to be buried was the 
right thing to do,” because so often “washing and burying the dead is 
an important [cultural practice].”
343
 As one CDC responder said, 
“‘Burial teams told me over and over how they had to sit and talk to 
families for hours before the family would let them take the corpse 
away for safe burial. . . just to make a family understand why it was 
helping the whole community to allow their loved one to be buried 
without the usual ritual.’”
344
 Needless to say, proper burial procedures 
would help in preventing the spread of Ebola. 
5. Contact Tracing 
Contact tracing is a vital component in preventing the spread of 
Ebola in an outbreak.
345
 Person-to-person transmission can lead to a 




















 Olushayo Oluseun Olu et al., Contract Tracing During an Outbreak of Ebola, 4 
FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH 1, 1 (2016). 
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large number of cases.”
346
 Experience shows “that rapid case finding, 
paired with proper infection control, is critical in order to stop the 
spread of Ebola.”
347
 The “CDC and [its] partners are using contact 
tracing to identify new Ebola cases quickly, which increases patients’ 
chances of survival,” and helps to “isolate patients as soon as they 
show symptoms, which prevents the spread [of EVD] to others.”
348
 
Failing to find a contact is an unacceptable standard for tracing teams, 
because even one oversight “can mean that Ebola will continue to 
spread, because sick people need care from others.”
349
 Contact tracing 
works, and [it has] been used in each of the previous twenty Ebola 
outbreaks over the past forty years to successfully control Ebola.”
350
 
During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, successful uses of contract tracing 
from Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal have demonstrated how effective the 




D. UNESCO, Bioethics, and Ebola 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) “has a key role to play in the global 
response” to outbreaks that endanger public health.
352
 UNESCO is 
“able to call upon expertise in a number of different fields (such as in 
culture, education, communication and the sciences), as well as rely on 
its close working relationship with ministries, civil society, other 
United Nations agencies, multi-laterals, and other development 
partners including the private sector,” which places UNESCO “in an 
                                                 
346
 Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/QG35-CBFA]. 
347












 UNESCO’S REPONSE TO EBOLA, supra note 254, at 5. UNESCO’s mission 
statement states: “As a specialized agency of the United Nations, UNESCO – 
pursuant to its Constitution – contributes to the building of peace, the 
eradication of poverty, and sustainable development and intercultural dialogue 
through education, the sciences, culture, communication and information.” Id. at 
14. 
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Given UNESCO’s “unique role in bioethics within the 
international community” and the severity of the 2014 Ebola 
outbreaks, the International Bioethics Committee (IBC), in 
conjunction with the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC), 
adopted a joint statement in September 2014 seeking to strengthen 
principles within the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights.
354
 The statement likewise aimed to “strengthen international 
support in ending the Ebola virus epidemic.”
355
 The joint Committees 
also called on states “to define and implement strategies to fight the 
epidemic, that involve local populations and [that] take into 
consideration the particular context within the affected countries, 
including their ethical, social, and cultural dimensions.”
356
 States were 
urged to “reinforce the capacities of their health systems so that they 
may face the epidemic financially, and materially,” by utilizing their 
resources and thereby obtain the ability to prevent the spread of Ebola 
now and in the future.
357
 UNESCO’s Response to Ebola involves 
thirteen mission critical actions and five Strategic Objectives 
(“STEPPS”): 
1. STOP the outbreak . . . Identify and Trace people with 
Ebola. . . 
2. TREAT the infected . . . Care for Persons with Ebola and 
Infection Control Medical Care for Responders. . . 
3. ENSURE essential services Provision of Food Security and 
Nutrition Access to Basic . . . including non-Ebola Health . . . 
Services Cash Incentives for Workers Recovery and 
Economy. . . 
                                                 
353
 Id. at 5. 
354
 Sharing of Benefits, Human Genetics and the Ebola Virus Epidemic Debated by 
UNESCO’s Committees on Bioethics, UNESCO (July 7, 2014), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/resources/online-materials/single-
view/news/sharing_of_benefits_human_genetics_and_the_ebola_virus_epid/, 




 UNESCO’S RESPONSE TO EBOLA, supra note 254, at 16. 
357
 Id. 
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4. PRESERVE stability Reliable Supplies of Materials and 
Equipment Transport and Fuel Social Mobilization and 
Community Engagement Messaging . . . [and]  
5. PREVENT outbreaks in countries currently unaffected. 358 
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND PREEMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Ebola has transformed the way the international community thinks 
about epidemiologic diseases. What will the global future look like, 
particularly for the World Health Organization? As mentioned above, 
“[t]here were 30 confirmed cases of [EVD] reported in the week 
[prior] to July 5, 2015: 18 in Guinea, 3 in Liberia, and 9 in Sierra 
Leone.”
359
 Although that was the “highest weekly total since mid-May 
[2015], improvements to case investigation and contact tracing, 
together with enhanced incentives to encourage case reporting, and 
compliance with quarantine measures” had already led responders 
even then to better understand how the virus spread.
360
 
The 2014 Ebola outbreak was a “complex emergency [that] 
galvanized a large number of stakeholders into action;” therefore, a 
proper system of coordination is required, and the effectiveness of the 
response will be hampered by “duplication, delays, and gaps in 
effort.”
361
 A number of different structures have already been put into 
place to inhibit the possibility of a future widespread outbreak, for 
example: “[(1)] the Emergency Operations Centre in Sierra Leone, 
[(2)] the Incident Management System in Liberia;” (3) the willingness 
of governmental decision makers to meet regularly with stakeholders, 
such as, other governmental officials, the UN, foreign governments, 
and the African Union.
362
 
The UN certainly has not been idle: 
From the UN and other stakeholders side, in addition to 
UNMEER, a number of different coordination 
mechanisms have been initiated to increase the 
effectiveness of the response, such as the weekly 
                                                 
358
 Id. at 14. 
359




 UNESCO’S RESPONSE TO EBOLA, supra note 254, at 11. 
362
 See id. 
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International Interagency Ebola Communication 
Coordination Call chaired by [the CDC], which 
includes a number of different stakeholders...
363
 
Lessons have been learned in Nigeria, a developing country that 
successfully prevented a wider spread of the epidemic by containing it. 
The story has a very clear message, as noted by Dr. Margaret Chan, 
the WHO Director-General:  
If a country like Nigeria, hampered by serious security 
problems, can do this—that is, make significant 
progress towards interrupting polio transmission, 
eradicate guinea-worm disease and contain Ebola, all 
at the same time—any country in the world 
experiencing an imported case can hold onward 
transmission to just a handful of cases.
364
 
Given analyses of previous Ebola outbreaks in central and eastern 
Africa,
365
 which “indicated the role of gender-related factors as key 
determinants of exposure and infection,” stakeholders should now 
know to place special consideration on women and on the effects of 
“mainstreamed gender” on their campaigns.
366
 The serious 
consequences of such past oversights as to the role of gender resulted 
in the “estimated gender asymmetries in Ebola infections and 
fatalities.”
367
 Speaking on a reflection panel highlighting ways to 
improve future responses in regards to gender considerations, the 
Executive Director of U.N. Women emphasized the importance of 
appealing and providing information to women, and “noted that such 
measures could have reduced the number of deaths.”
368
 




 See Nigeria is Now Free of Ebola Virus Transmission, supra note 111. 
365
 See Sophie Arie, Ebola: An Opportunity for a Clinical Trial?, BMJ (Aug. 6, 
2014), http://www.bmj.com/content/349/bmj.g4997 [https://perma.cc/7UXJ-
YFMB]. From 1976 to 2012, twenty-four outbreaks of Ebola have been reported 
“five in Uganda, six in [Democratic Republic of] Congo, four in Congo-
Brazzaville, three in Sudan, four in Gabon, one in Ivory Coast, and one in South 
Africa. The largest was in Uganda in 2000 when 425 people died.” Id. 
366
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As discussed above, quarantines can also be an appropriate weapon 
in the public health response arsenal, but must be employed 
cautiously; such drastic measures should only be used when they can 
accommodate to the standards established in the Siracusa Principles.
369
 
“When assessing the use of quarantines in the case of Ebola exposure, 
less drastic measures that could be equally effective should be 
considered first;” for example, since the first symptom of Ebola is 
fever, twice-daily temperature checks would be sufficient for 
monitoring a possible carrier “for symptoms so that he or she can be 
immediately and safely transported to a hospital with an isolation unit 
where Ebola can be treated.”
370
 
The launch of the African CDC, along with the creation of an 
African Surveillance and Response Unit, is a great step in the right 
direction; “[t]his unit will include an emergency operations center that 
can coordinate and staff future health emergency responses on the 
continent.”
371
 The African CDC “‘will help African countries 
effectively monitor public health, respond to public health 
emergencies, address complex health challenges, and build needed 
capacity’,” Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, chair of the African Union 
Commission, said in a CDC news release.
372
 In case of a future 
widespread outbreak in Africa, this would almost certainly reduce and 
prevent deaths from Ebola due to the lack of institutional 
infrastructure. This will be even more likely given the fact that under 
the agreement, the CDC “will provide technical expertise for the 
African CDC Surveillance and Response Unit, as well as advise 
African CDC leadership” on future development of the institution; it 
will also “support fellowships for ten African epidemiologists to help 
staff the African CDC Coordinating Center” in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
and five regional collaborating centers in other areas of the 
continent.
373
 As noted by Dr. Tom Kenyon, director of the CDC’s 
                                                 
369




 Preidt, supra note 302. 
372
 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, African Union and U.S. 




 Id. The epidemiologists will be responsible for disease surveillance, 
investigations, analysis, and for reporting trends and potential problems. Id. 
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Center for Global Health, “This is a landmark event in African 
ownership of improving health across the continent.”
374
 
Although “health workers have an ethical obligation to care for 
their patients, even if doing so involves some degree of risk” to their 
health, the affected country’s government has a responsibility to 
ensure that these health workers, and all others involved in the 
response, have the requisite training in infection control and proper use 
of protective equipment.
375
 Likewise, national governments have the 
onus upon them to “ensure that health care professionals and others 
involved in the response are promptly paid, and that social protection 
programs are in place for the families of government workers who 
[may] die or become ill as a result of their work in addressing the 
crisis.”
376
 Lessons should be learned and employed from domestic and 
international workers who raised concerns about a lack of training and 
appropriate personal protective gear and other related matters.
377
 
UNESCO will support the development of national plans and actions to 
arrange countries bordering widespread transmission sites to speedily scale 
up communication, social mobilization, and community engagement as 
described in the previous sections of this article. The ultimate aims are to 
improve community preparedness and response measures through 
communication and social mobilization, and to ensure that such 
communications ease social mobilization and community engagement, which 
is especially important for supporting behavior changes on traditional issues 
such as traditional burials, using Ebola Treatment Units, etc. 
Findings from Doctors without Borders, dealing with the Ebola 
epidemic in West Africa, indicate that fear is a limiting factor in trying 
to control EVD. In an interview, the international president for Doctors 
without Borders, Dr. Joanne Liu, said that “caring for patients is only 
one of the three ‘pillars’ of for controlling the Ebola outbreak.”
378
 The 
other two equally vital factors (or “pillars” as Liu, described) are 
tracing possible Ebola cases and educating community members.
379
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However, she further noted that the main problem was fear amongst 
bothstaff, volunteers, and especially community members, and even 
though “[f]ear is normal when you don’t understand what is going 
on. . . . [e]verybody has to overcome their own fear before coming to 
the field [to help].”
380
 Consequently, to eliminate that fear, Doctors 
without Borders needs go beyond funding, to seeking more volunteers 
who will engage with the community. Therefore, Dr. Liu concludes, 
there is a need for people who can engage the community and civic 
leaders to tell them about the public health challenge presented by a 
disease like Ebola, and “[to] mobilize the population and make them 
understand what is [really] going on.”
381
 
Consequently, tackling the fear factor is a lesson that can be used 
to prepare against potential future outbreaks.
382
 This means that 
dealing with the fears must involve not only the impacted community 
but also the volunteers who are there to work in those communities 
during an outbreak. It was thought that NGO volunteers during the 
outbreak, possibly because of fear, were not as quick to offer their 
services as they were in prior crises.
383
 Dr. Liu alluded to this fact by 
saying that it has not been easy getting help from the international 
community: “NGOs that I used to see in some other crises, like after 
the Haiti earthquake or even in [Central African Republic] or South 
Sudan, are not present right now in Western Africa.”
384
 Yet, without 
the involvement of other volunteer organizations, it is impossible to 
contain the Ebola epidemic, which leads to everyone else suffering, 
aside from the Ebola patients.
385
 Other patients seeking treatment for 






 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 19. Fear of Ebola has led to attacks on 
health workers. For example, an angry crowd attacked an Ebola treatment center 
in Macenta, Guinea accusing the Doctors Without Borders, who run the center, 
of bringing Ebola to the city. Id. In the same vein, people in N’Zérékoré, 
Guinea’s second largest city, rioted and protested the spraying of a market with 
disinfectant they believed was infected with the Ebola virus, causing injuries to 
over 50 people. Id. 
383
 See David Gauthier Villars & Jeanne Whalen, Ebola Crisis Stretches Doctors 




 What We Need to Contain Ebola, supra note 378. 
385
 Id. 
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non-Ebola related health service conditions related to malaria or 
maternity matters, for example, may have to deal with the ripple effect 
of a general lack of volunteers on the ground; Dr. Liu spoke about the 
challenges faced in welcoming six pregnant women who were ready to 
give birth to their babies, yet lost them, because they were walking 
around the city trying to find a place to deliver them, and that “by the 
time they got to our centers, the babies were not alive anymore.”
386
 
Henceforth, “[a]ll of UNESCO’s Programme Sectors and certain 
specialized central services will be mobilized to contribute to the 
Ebola response, both through sector-specific, and multi-sectoral 
strategies, as well as in line with its Medium-Term Strategy and the 
2014-2017 results framework.”
387
 The Division for Gender Equality, 
the Bureau of Strategic Planning, as well as other departments and 
teams, will provide support.
388
 
I believe the international community and its partners are better prepared 
for an Ebola outbreak today than they were during the outbreak of 2014. It 
should also be noted that there was no available vaccine for Ebola during the 
2014 crisis leading to the rush for the search for an Ebola vaccine, both 
during and after the outbreak, the subject of the next section. 
VI. THE RACE FOR DRUGS AND VACCINES 
With numerous Ebola-related deaths during the Ebola epidemic in 
2014, there is a race to the top to get an effective vaccine tested and 
approved, and to have them out there for those who need them.
389
 This 
is just another “arrow” desperately needed in the “quiver” of the Ebola 
arsenal.
390
 Ebola vaccine trials are being fast-tracked as a drug maker’s 
race to develop a vaccine.
391
 In the U.S., this race may have been 




 UNESCO’S RESPONSE TO EBOLA, supra note 254, at 15. 
388
 Id. “The Division for Gender Equality, the Africa Department, and the Director-
General’s crisis transition and response team will all provide backstopping and 
monitoring support for all initiatives.” Id. “The Bureau of Strategic Planning 
will also provide support related to field coordination and cooperation with 
donors.” Id. 
389
 Brandon Brown, Using the Ebola Outbreak as an Opportunity to Educate on 
Vaccine Utility, 11 J. OF BIOETHICAL INQUIRY, 415, 415 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
390
 See id. 
391
 See Big Pharma Bets on Bucks to be Made on Ebola Vaccine, NBC NEWS, (Oct. 
27, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/big-pharma-
bets-bucks-be-made-ebola-vaccine-n234576 [https://perma.cc/57U9-CLQ3]. 
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further encouraged by the US Department of Health and Human 
Services in its announcement on December 9, 2014, centered on the 
issuance of a new declaration that it would provide liability protection 
for activities related to Ebola virus vaccines.
392
 
Experts believe that wealthier nations such as the United States 
will readily invest in mass quantities of a safe vaccine, and then stash 
quantities of it for the future.
393
 In fact, the US government has 
invested more than any other country in researching neglected tropical 
diseases since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which augmented fears about 
possible bioterror attacks.
394
 The risks associated with finding a 
vaccine should not outweigh the benefits, and, after conducting such a 
moral risk/benefit analysis, the WHO ethics panel has approved the 
further testing of an Ebola vaccine.
395
 Johnson and Johnson is one of 
the companies that has accelerated its development of an Ebola 
vaccine, and has already begun clinical trials in 2015, rather than in 
2016 as previously planned.
396
 
A. Conduct of Clinical Trials 
Two experimental Ebola vaccines are now available to willing 
volunteers in Liberia as part of the next phase of clinical trials.
397
 A 
Liberia-U.S. clinical research partnership backed by the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), part of the 
                                                 
392
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 Ebola Vaccine Trial Opens in Liberia, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Feb. 2, 2015), 
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/ebola-vaccine-trial-opens-
liberia [https://perma.cc/F73P-HP9Y]. 
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National Institutes of Health (NIH), leads the clinical trial.
398
 The 
Partnership for Research on Ebola Vaccines in Liberia, also known as 
PREVAIL, “is designed to enroll approximately twenty-seven 
thousand healthy men and women aged 18 years and older,” mainly 
seeking its pool of volunteers from groups “at particular risk of Ebola 
infection, including health care workers, communities with ongoing 
transmission, contact tracers and members of burial teams.”
399
 The 
NIAID’s Director Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., reiterated the importance 
of trial safety in developing vaccines by stating that: 
It is imperative that any potential countermeasures, 
including vaccines, be tested in a manner that conforms 
to the highest ethical and safety standards in clinical 
trials designed to provide a clear answer to the 
question of whether a candidate vaccine is safe and can 




This is also why the WHO and international aid agencies, despite 
being eager to offer both vaccines, as well as other, therapeutic 
treatments, to the affected population, insist that “for ethical and 
practical reasons the drugs must first be tested on humans first.”
401
 
That is why the United States allows the application of the two animal 
rule in an emergency under US Federal and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) regulations, as follows: “as long as a drug has shown efficacy 
in two different animals and has proven not to have serious side effects 
                                                 
398
 Id. The NIH is the United States’ medical research agency, (which includes 27 
Institutes and Centers) and is a component of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. Id. It is the primary federal agency conducting and supporting 
basic, clinical, and translational medical research, and is investigating the 
causes, treatments, and cures for both common and rare diseases. Id. 
399
 Id. The three co-leaders of the vaccine trial are Stephen B. Kennedy, M.D., 
MPH, secretary-general of the Liberia College of Physicians and Surgeons; 
Fatorma Baloy, Ph.D., director, Liberian Institute for Biomedical Research; and 
H. Clifford Lane, M.D., NIAID’s deputy director for clinical research and 
special projects. Id. The pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline supplies the 
cAd3-EBOZ vaccine, while Merck and NewLink Genetics, Inc. supply the 




 Arie, supra note 365. A number of studies for possible treatments and vaccines 
carried out on primates and mice showed promise. Id. 
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In a partnership, the CDC, the Sierra Leone College of Medicine 
and the Allied Health Sciences, and the Sierra Leone Ministry of 
Health and Sanitation took volunteers for the “Sierra Leone Trial to 
Introduce a Vaccine against Ebola” (STRIVE).
403
 Like PREVAIL, this 
study will assess the safety and efficacy of the rVSV-ZEBOV Ebola 




However, because it will take time to be certain how much 
protection, if any, the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine may provide, and in the 
meantime health workers and other frontline volunteers who have 
received the vaccines are advised to “continue to take full preventive 
actions and procedures to protect themselves from Ebola.”
405
 
Recently, however, there has been tremendously positive news 
reported. In Guinea, more 11,841 people have received the vaccine 
known as rVSV-ZEBOV in a study that targeted people from societies 
with cases of Ebola.
406
 Apparently, none of those who have received 
the vaccine immediately has thus far contracted the virus.
407
 None of 
those vaccinated immediately were infected, as compared with 23 in 
the unvaccinated group.
408
 This means that the efficacy is 100%, and 
to add to this is the fact that the vaccine is proven to be well tolerated, 




 Ebola Vaccine Trial Begins in Sierra Leone, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2015/p0414-
ebola-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/C7LA-SVEE]. Participants were assigned 
randomly to one of two timeframes for vaccination: (1) right away or (2) about 
six months later. Id. All study participants will receive the vaccine and be 
followed closely for six months. Id. By comparing rates of Ebola virus disease 
in those who are vaccinated to those who have not yet received the vaccine, the 
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with few side effects.
409
 Given this success, and with a continued 
effort in gathering data on safety and efficacy, one could quickly 
expect results in the vaccine being licensed and rolled out as a public 
health measure.
410
 It is amazing that rVSV-ZEBOV was developed 
five years ago in Canada, but was left on the shelf,; safety trials in 
humans started during Autumn 2014, and trials in Guinea did not 
begin until March 2015, a year after the outbreak was recognized.
411
 
Consequently, it has been suggested that an urgently needed global 
vaccine development fund with contributions from governments, 




B. The Drug Companies Versus Africa: Who Benefits? 
There may be even more delays in the manufacturing of vaccines 
for EVD in Africa. Manufacturing drugs is, after all, a business for the 
drug companies, and so their profit margins are taken into 
consideration, and really should be. However, in an atmosphere where 
thousands were dying and there was a desperate need to alleviate the 
spread of deaths from Ebola, asking the question of whether the 
enormous time and cost for manufacturing sufficient volumes of the 
new drug for human use was arguably an improper question. An 
important consideration until the recent 2014 outbreak was the idea 
that this sort of investment simply did not make economic sense for 
either drug companies or government investment, because the disease 
apparently affected only a relatively small number of people in 
developing countries.
413
 Would this have been different if this 
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epidemic started in a developed world? I do not think so. This is likely 
an added reason why parts of the African population mistrust the West 
and “its” volunteer doctors and staff; at a time when there is fear and 
growing panic, along with schools closed in affected areas, 
government workers sent on compulsory leave, and people fleeing 
infected areas, the idea of Western doctors injecting African people 
with experimental drugs could be disastrous if it became prevalent 
notion amongst locals.
414
 This perception is likely why conducting 
clinical trials in Africa could sometimes prove difficult; it is an issue 
of mistrust. As one Ebola expert said: “Whereas Westerners might 
immediately consent to trying an experimental drug faced with a 56% 
chance of death. . . in Africa, there is a deep-seated mistrust around 
drug trials conducted by foreign [organizations].”
415
 However, in light 
of some of the recent successful trials and vaccines tested on people in 
Africa mentioned above, particularly in the three hardest hit countries 
by EVD, the gap of mistrust may have been greatly narrowed, 
rendering the issue of whether the vaccines are really meant to help or 
benefit Africans as opposed to the drug companies moot. 
C. Leveraging TRIPS for the Benefit of Africans? 
“One third of the world’s population—over two billion people—do 
not have regular access to the essential medicines that they need.”
416
 
This lack of access is even more prevalent within low and medium 
income nations, “where new or adapted medicines and vaccines to 




“Insufficient innovation and a lack of access to affordable 
medicines are major barriers to achieving a right to healthcare” in 
developing countries, in particular in countries like Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and Guinea.
418
 Once the Ebola vaccine is manufactured, 
tested, and ready to be used, there remain questions about its 
affordability and availability in the very countries and governments 
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that may have prompted its manufacture in the first place.
419
 Trade 
policies should not be used to “reward research with monopolies,” but 




The globalized patent system under the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is the 
“dominant incentive framework for the development of new 
medicines.”
421
 In 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was formed, the TRIPS Agreement introduced “minimum standards 
for protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights.”
422
 Under 
article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Members are required to 
make patents “available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology [including] patents for 
pharmaceutical processes and products,” like vaccines.
423
 The required 
“minimum term of protection that a country must make available” 
under the agreement is 20 years from the date of filling; however, at 
the Uruguay Round, countries were accorded the discretion to 
determine the duration of patents, and as a result, some countries did 
not grant patent protection for pharmaceutical products, while others 
excluded pharmaceutical processes.
424
 Despite this, in 1994 when 
TRIPS was introduced, it further reduced the “discretionary powers of 




Despite the TRIPS Agreement serving as a new beginning of sorts 
for obligations “regarding the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property,” WTO members still had flexibilities and 
safeguards, including the liberty to “determine the grounds for issuing 
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compulsory licenses.”
426
 Using compulsory licenses is one of the 
flexibilities existing in the TRIPS agreement that has been reaffirmed 
by the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which 
confirmed that countries are free to determine the grounds for granting 
compulsory licenses.
427
 Compulsory licenses may be issued on various 
grounds of general interest, such as for the public health.
428
 In other 
words, the TRIPS agreement allows a government under certain 
circumstances to issue a compulsory license, which is an authorization 
to use the patent of a rights holder, which would allow the authorized 
user the ability produce and market a cheaper generic medicine 
without the right holder’s express authorization.
429
 In exchange, the 
authorized generic firm must pay a license fee to the patent holder.
430
 
What may happen with the manufacture of an Ebola vaccine or 
drug for African countries? Can the pharmaceutical company simply 
price out potentially impacted African nations or refuse to sell to 
them? Apparently, not quite, because the WTO General Council 
allows WTO members to grant compulsory licenses for the production 
and export of generic medicines to both “developing countries” and 
“least developed countries” with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity in the pharmaceutical arena.
431
 This is referred to as the 
“Paragraph 6 Solution,” and was formalized as an amendment to the 
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TRIPS agreement in 2005.
432
 Therefore, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra 
Leone or any other developing country for that matter, may be able to 
invoke or leverage this provision to acquire drugs, and presumably 




This article has highlighted how the Ebola epidemic has been one 
of the most challenging global public health emergencies in recent 
times. “The size and scope of the epidemic demonstrates a need for 
stronger, sustainable disease detection and prevention capacity 
worldwide.”
434
 As the outbreak became more dire, cases began to 
appear in Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, and even the United States.
435
 In 
total, “nine countries have reported cases of Ebola” and “more than 
27,000 people have [been either] suspected. . . or confirmed to be 
carriers of the Ebola virus, with more than thousands confirmed 
dead.
436
 Needless to say, but no rep332orting is perfect, and these 
numbers are likely to have been worse.
437
 
Although any Ebola outbreak would likely result in some degree of 
death regardless of what precautions are taken, there are steps that can 
be taken to curtail the spread of the virus once its presence has been 
identified. During the outbreak in 2014, isolating individuals who are 
infected was the method used to protect uninfected people, but as has 
been documented, the isolation technique as not the most effective in 
curtailing the spread.
438
 A lack of clear procedures and responsibilities, 
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and the inadequate separation of Ebola patients from everyone else, 
staff shortages, lack of protective gear and other factors, contributed to 
the failure to adequately contain the spread of EVD.
439
 Therefore, a 
vigorous response of the health care system, acting in conjunction with 
strong public health policies and practices that are grounded in human 
rights principles, is crucial in averting further infections.
440
 In 
responding, the effective identification and treatment of people with 
the virus should be paramount, as well as contact charting and 
monitoring of people who may have been exposed to it. Making use of 
easy and available information campaigns, introducing strong 
protections for health care workers, and implementing measures to 
ensure that all people can have access to health care without 
discrimination are important. Should such an outbreak occur in 
countries that do not have adequate resources to effectively carry out 
such an effective response, as was the case in Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and other nations, the international community should provide 
assistance and expertise, and should do so in a prompt and timely 
manner. 
The clinical trials and manufacture of new Ebola vaccines is an added 
and welcomed dimension to the fight both against the spread of EVD and any 
other potential contagious outbreaks, especially while utilizing TRIPS to 
actively support governments that make use of the legal safeguards and 
flexibilities provided to protect and promote the public health. Hence, any 
such drug companies should provide medical products that are suitable, 
affordable, and accessible 
As a whole, and based on the discussions in this paper, I believe African 
countries, as well as the Western countries, are far better prepared for any 
potential Ebola outbreak today than they were in 2014. Although one hopes 
for no future outbreaks, the lessons learned should undoubtedly shape future 
responses to any Ebola outbreak. 
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